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1 Introduction
One of the key features of themodern and globalisedworld is foreign direct investment
(FDI). FDI has increased in both absolute terms, and relative to gross domestic product
(GDP), over the last few decades, and its importance has spawned a fairly sizeable
economics literature that has attempted to explain its nature, causes and consequences,
and the distinction between ‘horizontal’ FDI (where firms duplicate roughly the same
activities inmultiple countries) and ‘vertical’ FDI (which involves firms locating stages
of production in different countries).However, differentiating between these two forms
of FDI has remained an on-going challenge in the empirical literature on FDI.
From a public economics perspective, a broad consensus in the literature that taxes
affect FDI has emerged,1 but there has been limited empirical evidence on which
taxes affect which type of investment, ‘horizontal’ or ‘vertical’? Since the motives
behind these strategies differ, contingent on the factors that drive these alternative
forms of FDI, the effect of taxes could also differ. The aim of this paper is, therefore,
to explore the interaction between FDI strategies and tax policy, with a particular eye
to whether international tax system rules matter for both types of investment. It does
so by exploiting a large panel with an almost exhaustive coverage of cross-border
acquisitions (CBAs)—which has been the dominant form of FDI-across 30 countries
and over a decade (1999–2010).
Specifically, this paper makes two contributions. Firstly, and drawing on the work
by Fan andLang (2000), Fan andGoyal (2006), Alfaro andCharlton (2009), Acemoglu
et al. (2009), and Garfinkel and Hankins (2011), we differentiate between horizontal
and vertical investment strategies. As noted, we useCBAdatawhich has two important
advantages: it is the dominant form of FDI (UNCTAD 2000; Giovanni 2005), account-
ing for as much as 80% of worldwide FDI in any given year and being particularly
important in developed countries (Antràs and Yeaple 2014, p. 66); in addition, the cov-
erage of the location choices embodied in CBAs is extensive, as the data set contains in
excess of 80,000 international deals between 1999 and 2010 across 30 countries.2 Our
second contribution is to derive the tax elasticity associatedwith alternative FDI strate-
gies and identify which taxes affect which investment decision accounting also (fol-
lowing Barrios et al. 2012) for the effect of international taxation (that is, differences in
tax regimes, tax credits andwithholding taxes) across countries. The analysis considers
also the role of non-profit taxes on the location choices of multinational firms.3
1 Recent empirical work on the linkages between taxes and foreign direct investment (FDI) has addressed
issues relating to the use of statutory, effective average, or effective marginal rates in measuring the impact
of corporate income taxation and their role in the location decision of firms (as in, among others, Devereux
and Griffith 1998; Devereux et al. 2002; Devereux 2006; Buettner and Ruf 2007), the role of bilateral
tax treaties and international double taxation (as in Blonigen and Davies 2004; Huizinga and Voget 2009;
Barrios et al. 2012), the role of non-profit taxes (Desai et al. 2004; Buettner and Wamser 2009).
2 Aswill be noted shortly below, the estimation is performed by a suitably parameterized Poisson regression,
which aggregates the location choices into a count variable and hence requires a much lower number of
observations for estimation than a model of the (conditional) logit class.
3 Desai et al. (2004) have argued that, whilst international tax competition has lead to an erosion
of the tax rates on corporate income, other taxes levied on such things as sales or wage payments
have become relatively more important in influencing the decision to invest abroad. Indeed, for the
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The results show that the effect of various forms of taxes upon the incentive of
multinationals to invest in a foreign country is broadly negative; this is consistent
with much of the research on taxes and FDI that arises in the public finance literature.
For corporate taxes, the elasticity lies broadly between −1/20 and −9/20. The effect
of corporate taxes depends on the exact measure of taxation, whether the role of the
international tax burden is taken into account, aswell as the FDI strategy pursued by the
multinational firm. In particular, double taxation—which arises when the same profit
is also taxed in the parent country and when withholding taxes have to be paid in the
host country when repatriating profits—increases the detrimental effect of corporate
taxes on FDI. For sales taxes, the elasticity is around−1/4 but the effect arises primarily
with FDI that is driven by a horizontal strategy, where an affiliate is integrated into
the multinational enterprise to access the local market. Conversely, no significant
effect on the sales tax could be found with vertical FDI, which involves subsidiaries
producing export goods, on which the sales tax can normally be reimbursed at the
border.
With the extensive coverage of CBAs, the results in this paper differ from the extant
literature: the estimated tax elasticity is lower than generally reported elsewhere but
it also differs according to the underlying motivation for FDI; the effect of taxes
depends on how double taxation and withholding taxes are treated with again notable
differences between horizontal and vertical FDI; sales taxes do matter but it relates to
specific forms of FDI.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a synoptic
overview of the literature to which this paper relates. Section 3 outlines the methodol-
ogy for identifying alternative strategies for foreign direct investment highlighting the
distinction between horizontal and vertical CBAs. Section 4 addresses issues about
the relevant tax measure for the MNE accounting for additional parent country and
withholding taxes which may play a role in determining FDI. Section 5 presents the
location choice framework and discusses the control variables determining a firm’s
decision to acquire affiliates in foreign countries. Section 6 reports the results. Section
7 summarises and concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is connected with the following aspects of the literature on cross-border
acquisitions and FDI, the definition of FDI strategies, and the linkages between taxes
and FDI.
2.1 Cross-border acquisitions (CBAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI)
Discussion of the effects of taxes on FDI usually relies on data relating to FDI flows
or stocks or sales from multinational affiliates (De Mooij and Ederveen 2003, 2008).
Given data limitations, this has often inhibited a comprehensive coverage of the effects
Footnote 3 continued
case of US multinationals, Desai et al. (2004) present evidence that the importance of direct taxes has been
decreasing whilst the indirect tax burden has increased.
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across a large number of countries over a reasonably long period of time. This paper
uses data on CBAswhich, as noted already, presents twomain advantages. First, CBAs
are typically the dominant form via which FDI occurs, and second, CBA data are now
available across a large number of countries and years. Reflecting this, a growing
literature has begun to use CBA data to address FDI questions. Examples include the
role of investor protection and accounting rules (Rossi and Volpin 2004), valuation
effects in financial markets (Giovanni 2005; Erel et al. 2012), trade costs (Hijzen
et al. 2008), or the effect of the European integration (Coeurdacier et al. 2009). In
this literature, taxes have only appeared as a control variable on the distribution and
growth of CBAs without addressing international tax issues. The only exceptions are
Huizinga andVoget (2009)who, for a sample of European countries, have related taxes
with the headquarter decisions when firms merge across national borders as well as
Huizinga et al. (2012) who have found that international taxation affects the takeover
premia of CBAs.
FDI and CBAs do not overlap perfectly since a multinational enterprise could also
undertake greenfield investment. The early theoretical and empirical literature on FDI
referred primarily to greenfield investment where foreign plants are built from scratch
rather than being acquired. However, only small changes are required to adapt the
standard framework for addressing FDI to the case of CBAs (Antràs and Yeaple 2014,
p. 83). Furthermore, a growing theoretical literature has started to look specifically at
FDI through the lens of international mergers and acquisitions. This implies that FDI
can be seen as an outcome of international market for corporate control, to use the title
of Head and Ries (2008), where multinational enterprises engage in a bidding contest
when they want to take control over foreign assets. From an empirical perspective,
this provides the bridge to the location choice framework applied below, insofar as
profits (and hence the bidding capacities) differ across potential host countries due to,
e.g., differences in corporate taxes. In this regard, our empirical strategy follows the
approach of Hijzen et al. (2008) and Coeurdacier et al. (2009).
2.2 Determinants of FDI strategies
Research on domestic and international mergers and acquisitions has been develop-
ing across several sub-fields such as industrial organisation, finance, and international
economics. Consequently, a large number of motivations for acquisitions have been
identified: synergies, competition effects, technology transfers, spreading risks by
means of diversification and so on. UNCTAD (2000) gives an overview of the wider
considerations that may apply to CBAs and how the impact of CBAs in the host coun-
try may differ from greenfield investment. As regards corporate taxes, CBAs also raise
additional issues associated with transfer pricing and corporate inversions. Notwith-
standing these observations, in this paper, we focus more directly on the different
forms of CBAs which ties with the difference between horizontal and vertical strate-
gies that dominates in the international economics literature and research on FDI in
general (see Antràs and Yeaple 2014 for a recent survey).
Multinational firms pursuing a horizontal strategy seek to access markets by repli-
cating production facilities overseas, whilst a vertical strategy encapsulates the desire
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to fragment the production process. Vertical FDI involves the fragmentation of the
supply chain, with the production abroad leading to the export of intermediate goods.
Reflecting the different motives, horizontal and vertical FDI have been mostly asso-
ciated with investment flows between, respectively, developed and developing coun-
tries. However, the dominance of horizontal FDI between developed countries has
been questioned by Alfaro and Charlton (2009) who show—by directly measuring
the vertical relatedness between affiliate activity and the parent company—that a
substantial part of FDI between developed countries is actually vertical in nature
with a large proportion of this being intra-industry (that is, within broad industry
aggregates).4
Following the discussion above, it is relatively straightforward to apply the various
FDI strategies to the case of CBAs (Antràs and Yeaple 2014, pp. 83ff.). In particular,
a horizontal motive would imply that a foreign acquisitions involves a target firm in
the same industry to gain market access considerations, whilst a vertical motive would
imply that a foreign acquisition involves a target firm on a different stage of the value
chain to out-source production stages.
2.3 The role of taxes
There is a substantial body of research measuring the responsiveness of FDI to cor-
porate taxes. Early studies drew on statutory rates. Though the corresponding data are
readily available for a large number of countries, the rates stipulated in the tax code
are not necessarily appropriate when it comes to the market entry decisions that man-
ifest in the acquisition of a foreign firm. To more appropriately capture the long-term
implications of a foreign market entry that arise with FDI—e.g. taking into account
the capital depreciation and tax allowances of such investments—the effective average
tax rate (EATR) measures the net present value of tax payments as a proportion of the
net present value of pre-tax capital income (see Devereux and Griffith 1998; Devereux
et al. 2002; Buettner and Ruf 2007). Related to the EATR is the effective marginal
tax rate (EMTR) which measures the proportionate difference in post- and pre-tax
rates of return. This should matter more for incremental investments in foreign firms
rather than the location choices that occur when taking over control by means of a
CBA.
The burden of corporate taxation will also depend on the tax system applied with
respect to credits on taxes paid abroad, the treatment of repatriated profits, or the
withholding taxes imposed in the host country. An early study considering such inter-
national tax issues is Blonigen and Davies (2004), who found little evidence that the
existence of a bilateral tax treaty had an effect on US inbound and outbound FDI.
Within the context of CBAs, Huizinga and Voget (2009) provide a more comprehen-
sive view in terms of compiling data reflecting the contents of specific tax treaties.
They found that differences between countries applying a worldwide (or credit based)
and a territorial (or exemption based) tax system and the role of withholding tax rates
agreed in tax treaties impact upon the parent firm location in a given country. Without
4 The determination of the FDI strategies outlined in Sect. 3, follows Alfaro and Charlton (2009).
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focusing on CBAs, but using a similar approach to Huizinga and Voget (2009), Barrios
et al. (2012) suggest that source and host country taxes affect the location decision
of establishing foreign subsidiaries.5 It is important to note that the methodology we
apply follows Barrios et al. (2012) by relating to the discrete location decisions of
MNEs. However, as discussed in Sect. 5, our econometric strategy can cope with
the location choices embodied in the enormous number of CBA deals around the
world.
Whilst the literature on FDI has primarily considered the role of corporate taxes,
according to Desai et al. (2004) and Buettner and Wamser (2009), other (indirect)
taxes may also matter. This hypothesis rests on the observation that in most countries
the indirect tax burden levied on sales or labour cost of firms can exceed the amounts
to be paid in direct corporate income tax. However, as far as we are aware, the effect
of, for example, sales and labour taxes on CBAs has not yet been established. Desai
et al. (2004) argue that, whilst the international tax system deals with the role of credits
to avoid double corporate taxation, indirect taxes have no credit system that applies.
This, however, is only partially true when it comes to sales taxes: for FDI that is
motivated by market access (horizontal FDI), it is indeed the case that sales taxes will
apply and cannot be credited. But FDI can also be motivated by the fragmentation of
supply chains and foreign subsidiaries producing intermediate goods that are usually
exported back to the parent country (or some other country). As sales taxes can usually
be refunded at the border, they can be trade neutral (Keen and Syed 2006).6
As regards corporate taxation, the differences between greenfield investment and
mergers and acquisitions have appeared in Becker and Fuest (2010, 2011). However,
these theoretical contributions are mainly concerned with the welfare effects of tax
competition and coordination across different international tax systems.Theonly paper
that has explicitly addressed the crucial distinction between horizontal and vertical
integration is byMutti and Grubert (2004). In particular, they conjecture that corporate
taxes will have no effect on horizontal FDI, since the corresponding affiliates will be
on the same footing as domestic firms in the host country. Conversely, high taxes on
vertical FDI will place a subsidiary at a disadvantage, since it will be competing with
firms in the source country that have not invested abroad. The effect of taxes may
therefore depend on the motivation for FDI. However, apart from the lack of account
for the role of double taxation and international tax relief, Mutti and Grubert (2004)
also have no direct measure of vertical FDI. Still, the main merit of the their paper is to
tie with the focus of the international economics literature that MNEs pursue different
strategies and that this might matter for the effect of taxation.
In sum, it is clear from the preceding discussion that different taxes can have a
differential impact on the investment decisions of firms to invest in a foreign country.
But establishing the exact effect of those taxes on CBAs necessitates a method that
identifies FDI strategies, together with a careful consideration of double tax issues. It
is the former issue that we next turn to.
5 Whilst the focus here is on tax elasticities, as we note throughout, there may be many issues associated
with taxes and CBAs. As one of the referees pointed out, the role tax-havens may be a relevant. However,
there is no country in our sample that appears on the OECD tax-haven list.
6 Desai and Hines (2005) find the VAT to have a negative effect on net exports though they put this down
to inefficiencies in the VAT rebate system across the panel of countries they cover.
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3 Horizontal and vertical CBAs
Driven by the availability of detailed tax data, we focus on international CBAs between
32 source and31host countries.7 During the 1999–2010period, according toSDCPlat-
inum of Thomson Reuters, these countries have witnessed 82,182 deals and accounted
for more than 90% of the total number CBAs around the world. SDC Platinum has
been used elsewhere for empirical research on CBAs. Early studies (among others,
Rossi and Volpin 2004 and Giovanni 2005) have relied on the aggregate value of the
reported deals between pairs of source and host countries. The caveat against this is
that in the majority of cases, the deal value has not been disclosed by the merging
firms (Giovanni 2005, p. 134). To avoid this missing data problem, the literature (see,
for instance, Herger et al. 2008; Hijzen et al. 2008; Huizinga and Voget 2009, and Erel
et al. 2012) has relied on the number of deals, which is almost exhaustively available,
since SDC records virtually any change in ownership of at least 5%.8
To disentangle the impact of taxation across FDI strategies, the challenge is to dis-
tinguish between horizontal and vertical CBAs. For each deal, SDC Platinum reports
standard industry classification (SIC) codes of the acquirer and foreign target firm at
the 4-digit level denoted here by, respectively, SICa and SICb.9 This provides the basis
to uncover the industrial relationship between the merging firms. In particular, when
SICa = SICb, an acquisition involves firms operating in the same industry, which is
a typical feature of horizontal integration.
When tying down vertical acquisitions, however, it is not sufficient to observe that
the SIC codes of the acquiring and target firms differ; one also needs a direct mea-
sure of vertical relatedness that will explicitly identify the links within the supply
chain. Therefore, we draw on the methodology of Fan and Lang (2000) and Fan
and Goyal (2006), who have derived a measures of vertical relatedness from the
input:output structure of commodity flows between around 500 intermediate
industries using US accounts. More specifically, for every pair of industries, SICa and
SICb, the input:output tables allow the calculation of the value of sales from
SICa required to produce a dollar’s worth of SICb. The higher this measure—called
the vertical relatedness coefficient and denoted by Vab—the greater the degree to
which the corresponding industries are linked through the supply chain. By defining a
benchmark V , it is then possible to identify deals between firms operating in industries
with Vab > V that are deemed to be vertically related. Following Alfaro and Charlton
(2009), the 5% benchmark for V will be used for the baseline results, whilst the 1 and
10% values will be used for robustness checks.
7 The list of countries can be found in the data appendix.
8 Results between count and value data can, of course, differ since they refer, respectively, to the effect of
taxes on the location choice of a multinational firm and the amount to invest, once the decision to enter a
foreign market has been taken. Econometric issues arising with event counts are discussed in Sect. 5.
9 To accurately identify investment strategies pursued by multinational firms, Alfaro and Charlton (2009)
strongly advocate the use of a highly disaggregated classification at the four-digit level. Arguably, this
avoids the misclassification of a considerable number of acquisitions involving firms in adjacent industries
as horizontal acquisitions.
123
Multiple taxes and alternative forms of FDI 89
Table 1 Definition of horizontal and vertical FDI
FDI strategy Horizontal relatedness Vertical relatedness
Pure horizontal ∃ r, s such that SICra = SICsb V rsab < V , ∀ r, s
Pure vertical SICra = SICsb, ∀ r, s ∃ r,s such that Vrsab > V
One potential issue in matching SIC codes is that firms often operate in several
industries; the SDC database reports up to 6 different SIC codes for both acquiring
and target firms. To reflect the prevalence of diversifiedmultinational firms, we analyse
the horizontal and vertical relatedness between an acquirer, denoted by r , and target
firm, denoted by s, across every potential pair of industries in which they operate.
Since there are up to six industries for acquiring and a target firm there are up to 36
pairs which imply the following classification: as to whether CBAs involve firms that
are horizontally, that is SICra = SICsb, or vertically, that is Vrsab > V , related:
(i.) ‘Pure horizontal’ acquisitions between acquiring and target firms sharing at least
one combination of 4-digit SIC codes, but are vertically unrelated in any of the
36 possible combinations of SICra and SIC
s
b; and
(ii.) ‘Pure vertical’ acquisitions between acquiring and target firms related in at least
one combination of industries through the supply chain, but have no common
industry codes for across the (up to) 36 combinations of SICra and SIC
s
b codes.
Table 1 formalises the definition of the alternative FDI strategies.10
The distribution of the 82,182CBAs between 1999 and 2010 in the sample of source
and host countries is reported in Table 2. The second column shows the breakdown
of all deals across the top 10 source and host countries. Notice that the same devel-
oped countries, that is the USA, the UK, Canada, Germany, and France, are the most
important source and host nations for CBAs and that they alone account already for
more than half of all deals.
Using the methodology of Table 1, the alternative investment strategies charac-
terising these CBAs are reported in the remaining columns of Table 2. Of the total
number of acquisitions, around 50% of all deals are classified as purely horizontal
or vertical. Using the 5% benchmark for V , 19% are classified as ’pure’ horizontal
and 37% as ’pure’ vertical. Substantial shifts in the distribution of FDI strategies arise
when alternative benchmarks are used for V . Specifically, with the 10% benchmark
employed (which raises the threshold of vertical relatedness defining that industries
are connected through the supply chain), around 29% are classified as ‘pure’ hori-
zontal and 11% as ‘pure’ vertical acquisitions. Conversely, with the 1% benchmark
employed (which lowers the threshold for defining vertical integration), vertical deals
dominate with 57% whilst only 8% of all CBAs would be deemed to be horizontal.
10 Notice that the classification can also produce less clear outcomes. For example, acquisitions involving
firms in the same SIC also pass the measure of vertical relatedness. This would be compatible with complex
strategies combining several motives for FDI as discussed in, for example, Yeaple (2003). However, to avoid
ambiguities and produce a close concurrence with the established theories on FDI strategies, the analysis
will focus on acquisitions that are ‘purely’ horizontal or vertical according to the definition of Table 1.
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Table 2 Number of CBAs,
1999–2010
AllCBAs Horizontal
(V = 5%)
Vertical
(V = 5%)
Top 10 source countries
USA 20,064 3113 6130
UK 10,892 2275 2916
Canada 7248 1226 2514
Germany 5927 1089 1811
France 5698 1507 1608
Netherlands 3777 796 1111
Sweden 3216 754 870
Switzerland 2992 602 864
Australia 2832 480 814
Japan 2654 330 939
Total 82,182 15,671 24,250
Top 10 host countries
USA 16,440 3159 5136
UK 9320 1832 2864
Germany 7159 1293 2107
Canada 5815 970 1657
France 4921 931 1387
Spain 3096 770 756
Australia 3052 413 881
Sweden 2921 601 867
Italy 2871 613 762
Netherlands 2727 494 838
Total 82,182 15,671 24,250
Hence, a shift between the conventionally used benchmark values V has a substantial
effect on the empirical distribution between horizontal and vertical strategies meaning
that it will be important to make this distinction when establishing the effect of taxes
on CBAs below.
4 Double taxation and international tax relief
Aside from the distinction between statutory and effective tax rates discussed in Sect.
2, international tax matters—and, in particular, double taxation and international tax
relief—influence investment decisions. Following Huizinga and Voget (2009) and
Barrios et al. (2012), the consolidated tax burden, denoted by τi j t , from FDI between
source country i into host country j during year t is given by
τi j t = τ j t + τi t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t , (1)
where τ j t is the host country tax rate, τi t is the source country i tax rate, and ωi j t cap-
tures any withholding taxes when multinationals repatriate the after-tax profits, given
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by (1 − τ j t ), to the source country i . Since most FDI is subject to some double tax
relief, the tax rate in (1) is rarely applied in practice. The amount of double tax relief
depends on the international tax system—that is, whether the source country applies
a territorial or worldwide regime where international tax relief occurs, respectively,
through exemptions and tax credits—and whether the source and host country have
signed a bilateral tax treaty stipulating the tax system that applies between them or
the maximum amount of withholding taxes. In countries with a territorial tax sys-
tem, foreign profits are exempted from domestic taxation implying that τi t = 0. The
international tax burden on the multinationals is, then,
τ ei j t = τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t . (2)
In countries with aworldwide system, domestic corporate taxesmust be paid even if
the profits have been earned abroad but, to reduce the double tax burden, firms can earn
credits on foreign tax payments.11 The international tax burden on the multinationals
is, then,
τi j t = τi t + τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t − ci j t , (3)
where ci j t denotes the tax credits.
With an indirect tax credit system corporate and withholding taxes are both cred-
itable, that is cii j t = τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t , whereas direct tax credits apply only to
withholding taxes meaning cdi j t = (1 − τ j t )ωi j t . Since the tax credit is restricted to
the tax burden that would accrue to the same profit in the parent country, we have that
cii j t = min[τi t , τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t ] and cdi j t = min[τi t , ωi j t ] (Huizinga and Voget
2009, p. 1223). In sum, the international tax burden equals
τ ii j t =
{
τ j,t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t if τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t > τi t
τi t if τ j t + (1 − τ j t )ωi j t < τi t , (4)
for the indirect tax credit system and
τ di j t =
{
τ j t + (1 − τ djt )ωi j t if ωi j t > τi t
τ j t + (1 + ωi j t )τi,t if ωi j t < τi t ,
(5)
for the direct tax credit system (see also Barrios et al. 2012, pp. 949ff.).12
One issue in dealing with double taxation and international tax relief is the potential
to defer the repatriation of profits and, hence, postpone the payment of corporate taxes
11 During the period under consideration, a number of countries have switched from a credit based towards
an exemption-based system. Examples include the Czech Republic (2004), Norway (2004), Poland (2007),
Japan (2009), and the UK (2009) with the year of the transition reported in parentheses.
12 Before changing to an exemption-based system in 2004, the Czech Republic used a deduction-based
system where foreign taxes can be subtracted from the domestic taxable profits. According to Barrios et al.
(2012), the international tax rate is then equal to 1 − (1 − ti t )(1 − τ j t )(1 − ωi j t ).
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in the home country.13 In practice, it is difficult to establish whether a firm has an
incentive to keep unrepatriated profits in an acquired subsidiary abroad (see Huizinga
and Voget 2009, pp. 1230ff.). Furthermore, most countries impose complex rules
and regulations as regards the repatriation of foreign profits. Hence, one merit of
distinguishing between the effect of host country taxes τ j t and the international tax
burden τi j t is that this might shed light into the importance of deferral (Barrios et al.
2012, p. 951). In particular, a lower impact of τi j t compared with τ j t could suggest
that the repatriation of profits is often deferred to a degree where issues of double
taxation are of minor concern. A possible difference with the host country tax effect
can arise from both the withholding tax ωi j t or the additional corporate taxes that can
accrue, in particular, in parent countries with a worldwide tax system. In sum, we will
use the host country tax τ j t , measured with the statutory or effective rates, as baseline
variables as well as (2)–(5) to infer the effect of international double taxation on CBAs.
For a set of European countries, Huizinga andVoget (2009) andBarrios et al. (2012)
provide detailed information about the tax system as well as the withholding tax rates
that apply according to bilateral tax treaties. To calculate the international tax burden,
we have compiled some new data that also cover major countries outside Europe that
appear in our common sample including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, the USA, and South Africa.14 To concur
with Huizinga and Voget (2009) and Barrios et al. (2012), profits are assumed to be
repatriated in form of dividends.
As mentioned above, non-profit taxes might also matter for the location choice
of firms. To account for this, we follow the literature (Desai et al. 2004; Buettner
and Wamser 2009) and include the rates of value-added and other sales taxes in the
host country. Furthermore, labour taxes and the amount of compulsory social security
contributions to be paid in each country might be relevant when the desire to outsource
labour intensive production stages to low-wage countries provides the motive for
acquiring a foreign firm. Following Braconier et al. (2005), labour tax data have been
extracted from the Prices and Earnings survey of UBS (various years).15
5 A location choice framework for CBAs
CBAs encapsulate a decision to locate economic activities in a given host country.
Therefore, the analysis of this data is conducted within a location choice framework,
13 Another issue is that effective tax rates are usually calculated for local conditions, whilst in an interna-
tional context, the tax burden on an investment depends also on the conditions abroad. This could give rise
to non-linearities between, say, withholding and effective corporate taxes. As in Huizinga and Voget (2009)
and Barrios et al. (2012), these complex second order effects are neglected here. Recent data accounting
for this are only available for a set of European countries (see ZEW 2008).
14 The sources to compile this information were the Corporate and Indirect Tax Survey of KPMG (various
years), the Deloitte International Tax Source (DITS), the country-specific lists of double taxation treaties
of UNCTAD, as well as information published by the relevant national tax authorities.
15 Buettner and Wamser (2009) also consider the role of import duties and excises for which they find
no effect on the location choice of German multinationals. Since the trade freedom variable, discussed in
Sect. 5, already contains a component measuring the tariff barrier in each country, we have not included a
separate variable for import duties and excises.
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which models the host country decision embodied in each deal.16 Specifically, the
desire to acquire a foreign subsidiary rests on the opportunity to generate an income
stream of R and, thus, earn an expected profit of
πdi j t =
(
1 − τi j t
)
R
(
xi j t , τ
o
jt , δi , δ j , δt
)
(6)
whose value depends, in turn, on several factors.17 In particular, as discussed above,
firms are thought to be reluctant to invest in the face of high tax rates τi j t levied directly
on corporate income, but also other forms of taxation τ ojt accruing, for example, to
the value-added component of R. The control variables are summarised in xi j t . Year-
specific components δt absorb global developments within the international market for
corporate control that sustain the observed wave-like pattern in international merger
activity (see Giovanni 2005). Finally, δi and δ j absorb all factors that are specific to,
respectively, the source and host countries.
Equation (6) forms the basis for our empirical strategy. However, expected profits
πi j t are not directly observable. Therefore, we follow a growing literature (see, for
example, Devereux and Griffith 1998; Buettner and Ruf 2007; Buettner and Wamser
2009; Barrios et al. 2012, and Head and Ries 2008) exploiting the fact that observed
CBA deals encapsulate a location choice that identifies the country with the highest
expected profit opportunity, that is
hdi j t =
{
1 πdi j t > π
d
i j ′t ∀ j ′ = j
0 otherwise,
(7)
where j ′ denotes alternative hosts where a firm could, in principle, also have made
an acquisition. Insofar as taxes affect the profits according to (8), they determine the
desirability of multinational firms to bid for foreign firms in various host countries
and manifest themselves finally in the market entry decision of hdi j t .
The regression equation related with (6) is given by
πdi j t = x̃ j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δi + δ j + δt + εi j t ,
i = 1, . . . , I ; j = 1, . . . , J ; t = 1, . . . , T, (8)
where x̃i j t = ln(xi j t ) and τ̃i j t = ln(τi j t ), and β and γ are coefficients to be estimated,
and εi j t is a deal-specific error term.
Aside from the details of the tax variables τ̃i j t that have been discussed in the
previous section, the set of control variables x̃i j t accounts for the established factors
16 This paper, therefore, departs from the bulk of the empirical literature which measures the impact of
taxes upon aggregate stocks and flows of FDI by means of gravity equations. Though similar variables
are employed, it is important to emphasise that the specification of location choice models differs from
the standard gravity equations. Above all, location choice models are highly non-linear since they draw on
extreme value distributions identifying the best option available. Therefore, the handling of country and
time-specific effects differs fundamentally from linear gravity equations.
17 See Devereux and Griffith (1998) for a similar specifications to modelling the profits of multinationals.
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to explain the location choices of multinational firms. In particular, real GDP in the
host country reflects the market access motive of FDI. The expected sign is positive
since it is more likely that a multinational firm acquires a target in a larger economy.
Higher wage costs are expected to have a negative effect on the decision to locate in
any specific country. Owing to the separate inclusion of labour taxes, a measure for
wages net of payroll taxes and compulsory social security contributions is used. Even
when wages are low, multinational firms might be reluctant to enter foreign markets
with rigid labour market regulations. This is proxied by an index on labour market
freedom. The distance between the source and host countries as well as whether they
share a common border account for the effect of geography on FDI. Trade freedom is
an index that captures the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in the host
country. For the multinational firm, this will matter when intermediate goods provide
inputs for foreign subsidiaries or given that exports (subject to trade costs) can be used
as an alternative strategy to establishing a local plant when serving a foreign market.
Other factorswhich influence the openness of the country to FDI are given by invest-
ment freedom, an index measuring whether the government treats foreign firms in the
same way as domestic investors, whether specific industries are closed to investment,
whether governments impose restrictions on capital transactions and transfers—the
expected effect of this variable is positive. An index on shareholder rights controls for
the role of corporate governance, emphasised in Rossi andVolpin (2004), when acquir-
ing a foreign firm. During the period under consideration, a number of countries joined
the European Union or adopted the Euro as a common currency. Following Coeur-
dacier et al. (2009), this will be captured by two sets of dummy variables reflecting,
respectively, whether source and host country or only the host country are a member of
the European Union or the Euro. Finally, exchange rates are also a likely determinant
of FDI. Following Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen (1997), a (real) appreciation of
the currency of the host country is expected to have a negative effect since this makes
a foreign acquisition more expensive when expressed in the home currency. Detailed
definitions and data sources as well as the summary statistics for each of the variables
are reported in the data appendix.
Head and Ries (2008) have developed a framework to theoretically model the
bidding process that occurs when FDI is thought to arise via the international market
for corporate control. One of the main ingredients of their approach is that the deal-
specific component error term εi j t is assumed to follow a Gumbel, or type I extreme
value distribution, to reflect that the highest bid is going to win in a stylised auction
for the control of a foreign target. From this, it is a short step to see that the probability
that a firm of source country i acquires a target in country j during year t takes a
multinomial logit form, that is
Pdi j t = Pi jt =
exp(̃xi j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δ j )∑I
i=1
∑M
l=1
∑T
t=1 exp
(
x̃iltβ + τ̃iltγ + δ j
) . (9)
Owing to the exponential nature of (9), the components δi and δt pertaining, respec-
tively, to source countries and years drop out. Thus, only variables such as taxes that
differ across the alternatives, that is the host countries j , affect the location choice
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embodied in each CBA deal. In other words, location choice approaches obviously
exploit the heterogeneity in, say taxes, arising between the locations a multinational
firm can potentially choose from.18
Though models of the (binary, conditional, and nested) have been used to estimate
how corporate taxes impact upon location choices such as hdi j t (see, for example, Dev-
ereux and Griffith 1998; Buettner and Ruf 2007; Buettner and Wamser 2009; Barrios
et al. 2012), their main limitation is the massive number of observations in a sample
encompassing a large number of countries and years as we have here. For example,
our sample with 82,182 CBA deals and 31 potential host countries would have neces-
sitated the compilation of a dataset with around 2,500,000 observations. However, the
issue that location choice models of the logit class can become very cumbersome to
estimate can be avoided by turning to the Poisson regression (Guimarães et al. 2003),
which has the advantage of requiring a substantially smaller number of observation
to obtain the same coefficients (see also; Schmidheiny and Brülhart 2011; Herger and
McCorriston 2013).19 In this case, the interpretation of the coefficients, such as γ ,
pertaining to logarithmically transformed coefficients, such as τ j t , is that of a constant
(tax) elasticity. “Appendix 3” provides the technical details.
The present location choice framework for CBAs has benefits in that it is embedded
in the profit function (6) that can, in turn, be connected with theoretical models of FDI
and CBAs. However, there are also some limitations. Firstly, the choice is here over the
acquisition of a foreign subsidiary and, in the version above, does not contemplate other
dimensions such as the difference between mergers and acquisitions and greenfield
investment (Becker and Fuest 2011) or the choice of headquarter (Huizinga and Voget
2009). Also, firm-specific considerations such of profit shifting and tax planning drop
out with the deal-specific component δd . Nevertheless, tax effects on location choices
by means of CBAs are an important part of international tax competition and the
current framework provides a comprehensive and tractable method to estimate the
corresponding effects. The next section will turn to the results.
6 Results
6.1 Baseline results
Table 3 reports the results connecting the econometric approaches that are based on
the location choice revealed from CBA deals with the empirical literature on FDI
and taxes. Ignoring for the moment additional parent country and withholding taxes,
Columns 1 and 2 employ statutory tax rates, Columns 3 and 4 effective average tax
rates, and Columns 5 and 6 effective marginal tax rates to measure τ j t . Columns 2, 4,
18 One should be aware of the deviations from conventional gravity equations. Owing to the non-linear
nature, even with time-dummy variables δt , a time-constant variable can enter the location choice model as
long as its values differ across the different options (here host countries j).
19 For a smaller sample with location choices by US multinationals, the exact overlap of the estimated tax
effects between the conditional logit model and the Poisson regression is shown in Herger et al. (2011).
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Table 3 Results for statutory and effective tax rates
Corporate tax Statutory rate EATR EMTR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.38***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Net wage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance −0.62*** −0.62*** −0.62*** −0.62*** −0.62*** −0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47*** 0.47***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Investment freedom 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.16***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade freedom −0.04 −0.04 −0.05 −0.04 −0.05 −0.05
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Labour market
freedom
0.40*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.30** 0.30** 0.24*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Shareholder rights 1.47*** 1.45*** 1.43*** 1.42*** 1.37*** 1.36***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
EU∗i tEU j t −0.51 −0.50 −0.51 −0.50 −0.50 −0.49
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
(1 − EUi t )∗EU j t −0.01 0.001 −0.01 0.001 0.004 0.01
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57)
Euro∗i tEuro j t 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1−Euroi t )∗Euro j t −0.38*** −0.38*** −0.38*** −0.39*** −0.39*** −0.39***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange rate −0.54*** −0.54*** −0.56*** −0.56*** −0.58*** −0.58***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate tax (τ j t )
(host country)
−0.21*** −0.22*** −0.17*** −0.17*** −0.04 −0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Sales tax −0.19*** −0.15** −0.15***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Labour tax 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
# CBA 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
# Obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
ln L −26,079 −26,075 −26,081 −26,079 −26,085 −26,082
The dependent variable is the number ni j t of CBA deals between source country i and host country j during
year t . Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression with fixed effects αi t . Aside from the
dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory variables have been transformed into logarithms such
that the coefficients reflect constant elasticities. All specification include host country dummy variables δ j .
For the 1999–2010 period, the data cover all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed in
the data appendix. Furthermore, # CBA is the total number of deals, # obs is the number of observations,
and ln L the maximised value of the log-likelihood function of the Poisson regression. Standard errors (SE),
clustered by αi t , are reported in parentheses.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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and 6 consider this with the inclusion of other taxes levied on sales andwage payments.
The results refer to the number of CBAs during the 1999–2010 period with 82,182
observed deals between 32 source and 31 host countries for which detailed tax data
were available (see data appendix). The sample involves an unbalanced panel with
11,248 observations covering 379 pairs of source countries and years.20
Inspection of the results across the six specifications of Table 3 reveals that the
coefficients of the control variables concur with the theoretical priors. In particular,
economic size, a cheap foreign currency, the proximity between countries, institu-
tional quality (in terms of investment and labour market freedom and the protection
of shareholder rights), and joint membership of the Euro Zone significantly enhance
a country’s capacity to attract CBAs. EU membership and trade freedom have an
insignificant effect, which might reflect that the trade barriers within our sample with
mainly developed host countries are already relatively low. The effect of wage cost is
also insignificant. Again, within the current sample with mainly developed countries,
the desire to outsource labour intensive production processes to low-wage countries
is apparently not a key factor driving international acquisitions. Note, however, that
the variable that measures labour market flexibility is significant.
With respect to taxation, as noted above, there is broad evidence that corporate
taxes reduce a country’s capacity to attract FDI. This is confirmed by the results of
Table 3, where corporate taxes τ j t , measured by statutory and effective average rates in
Columns 1–4, have a negative and significant effect on CBA activity. With the EMTR,
an insignificant coefficient arises in Columns 5 and 6. This is perhaps not surprising
since effective marginal tax rates should matter for incremental investments affecting
the value of FDI rather than the discrete location choices associated with the number
of CBAs.21 Interestingly, compared with the vast literature on the effect of taxes on
FDI, the values of the elasticities are relatively low.
Other dimensions of taxation matter for international investment decisions. For the
sample covering all CBAs, relatively high sales taxes reduce the probability that a
foreign country attracts an acquisition. This coincides with the findings of Desai et al.
(2004) about the effect of indirect taxes on the affiliate sales of US multinationals,
but differs from Buettner and Wamser (2009), who found that sales taxes had no
significant effect on the location choice by German multinationals. Taxes levied on
wage payments have no significant effect on the location choices inferred from CBA
deals. This result coincides with that of Buettner and Wamser (2009), who attributed
20 As noted in Sect. 5 and shown in “Appendix 3”, the coefficient estimates that resulted from a fixed
effects Poisson regression are identical with those of a conditional logit model for the location choice of
host countries j .
21 We have also experimented with some regressions using the deal value of CBAs as the dependent
variable. Recall, from the discussion of Sect. 3, that these data are highly incomplete in the sense that
for the majority of CBAs, SDC Platinum did not report the deal value. Furthermore, a preponderance of
the aggregate deal values between source and host countries during a given year were zero-valued. This
issue could be tackled with either a Tobit regression or a pseudo Poisson maximum likelihood approach.
In both cases, when using aggregate deal values, a significant effect did arise with the EMTR. However,
as mentioned above, the incompleteness of the value data introduce severe caveats. Therefore, we do not
report and discuss these results here.
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this to a scenario where labour is inelastically supplied, and internationally immobile,
and as such they bear the labour tax burden.
6.2 International tax effects
Table 4 extends the analysis of the impact of taxes uponCBAs by accounting additional
parent country and withholding taxes. As discussed in Sect. 4, multinational firms can
be subject to double taxation. Specifically, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 consider the
effect the international corporate tax burden τi j t that depends, according to Eqs. (2)–
(5), on such things as the international tax system, the double tax relief stipulated in
bilateral tax treaties, or the withholding tax rate ωi j t when repatriating profits from
host country j to parent country i .
Similar to the results above, international corporate taxes impact negatively upon
the number of CBAs regardless whether they are measured on the basis of statutory or
effective average rates in, respectively, Column 1 and 2.22 Recall that the international
tax burden applies only when profits are repatriated, which is notoriously difficulty
to verify. Hence, the differences between the results of Tables 3 and 4 could provide
some indirect evidence on the relevance of deferring the repatriation of profits in
order to reduce the tax burden. In this regard, for CBAs, there is no evidence that the
deferral reduces the importance of the (international) tax burden on corporate profits.
Rather, with coefficients of around −0.4, the impact of the international tax burden
τi j t is more than double the corresponding value of the host country tax τ j t used in
Table 3. Barrios et al. (2012, p. 953) found an even larger elasticity of around −0.8
on the international corporate tax burden. However, their sample covered only 909
new foreign subsidiaries within European countries, whilst our data cover more than
80,000 CBAs from countries around the world.
The remaining columns of Table 4, following Barrios et al. (2012), split the interna-
tional corporate tax burden τi j t into its individual components. Distinguishing again
between statutory and effective average rates, together with corporate taxes in the host
country τ j t , Columns 3 and 4 introduce a separate variable for the double tax burden
τi j t − τ j t arising when profits are repatriated to a given parent country. The effect
is again negative. As discussed in Sect. 4, the additional taxes a multinational firm
has to pay depend mainly on the tax system of the parent country and the withhold-
ing tax rates in the country from which the profits are repatriated. Columns 5 and 6
distinguish these components by attributing double taxes to the effect of withholding
taxes (1− τ j t )ωi j t and the corporate taxes remaining to be paid in the parent country
τi j t −τ j t − (1−τ j t )ωi j t . Note that the latter can vary across locations since the parent
country tax rate depends, for example, on whether a bilateral income tax treaty has
been signed with a given host country. A significantly negative effect arises for the
additional taxes in the parent country, which is consistent with the findings [but not the
magnitude of the coefficients of the corporate tax components: the ones being smaller
22 We have not calculated the international tax burden with the EMTR, since the withholding taxes, which
enters the international tax burden, accrues to the after-tax profits that are repatriated.Meanwhile, the EMTR
measures the difference in post- and pre-tax rates of return, which is somewhat disconnected with the actual
tax payments that define the value of, for example, tax credits.
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Table 4 Results with the international tax burden
Corporate tax Statutory EATR Statutory EATR Statutory EATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 0.28*** 0.27***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Net wage 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 −0.003 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Distance −0.61*** −0.61*** −0.58*** −0.61*** −0.58*** −0.61***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Border 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.49***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Investment freedom 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.12***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Trade freedom −0.03 −0.04 −0.01 −0.04 −0.01 −0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Labour market
freedom
0.35*** 0.35*** 0.22* 0.29** 0.20 0.29**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Shareholder rights 1.40*** 1.36*** 1.26*** 1.19*** 1.12*** 1.04***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
EU∗i tEU j t −0.52 −0.54 −0.50 −0.60 −0.54 −0.65
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
(1 − EUi t )∗EU j t 0.01 −0.02 0.05 −0.04 0.01 −0.10
(0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Euro∗i tEuro j t 0.27** 0.27** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.25***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
(1−Euroi t )∗Euro j t −0.36*** −0.36*** −0.35*** −0.32*** −0.31*** −0.28***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Exchange rate −0.50*** −0.53*** −0.51*** −0.57*** −0.55*** −0.62***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Corporate tax
(international:
τi j t )
−0.40*** −0.41***
(0.03) (0.03)
Corporate tax
(host: τ j t )
−0.27*** −0.28*** −0.24*** −0.23***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Corporate tax
(double: τi j t -τ j t )
−0.12*** −0.14***
(0.01) (0.01)
Corporate tax
(parent: τi j t −
τ j t−(1−τ j t )ωi j t )
−0.09*** −0.06***
(0.01) (0.01)
Withholding tax
((1 − τ j t )ωi j t )
−0.15*** −0.17***
(0.01) (0.01)
Sales tax −0.19*** −0.15** −0.17** −0.15** −0.25*** −0.27***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
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Table 4 continued
Corporate tax Statutory EATR Statutory EATR Statutory EATR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Labour tax 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
# CBA 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182 82,182
# Obs 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248 11,248
ln L −25,979 −26,013 −23,717 −25,838 −23,628 −25,786
The dependent variable is the number ni j t of CBA deals between source country i and host country j during
year t . Estimation is by maximum likelihood of a Poisson regression with fixed effects αi t . Aside from the
dummy variables (Border, EU, Euro), the explanatory variables have been transformed into logarithms such
that the coefficients reflect constant elasticities. All specifications include host country dummy variables
δ j . For the 1999–2010 period, the data cover all CBAs between the 32 source and 31 host countries listed
in the data appendix. Furthermore, # CBA is the total number of deals, # obs is the number of observations,
and ln L the maximised value of the log-likelihood function of the Poisson regression. SE, clustered by αi t ,
are reported in parantheses.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
than in the aggregate cases of Columns (1) and (2)] of Barrios et al. (2012 , pp. 954,
956). The effect of withholding taxes is also significantly negative. The corresponding
effect in Barrios et al. (2012) is insignificant which is perhaps not surprising since
their sample contained only European countries where withholding taxes tend to be
low and, for EU countries, even zero by virtue of the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
6.3 Horizontal and vertical CBAs
Following the procedure outlined in Sect. 3, Table 5 reports the results that relate to
the distinction between the horizontal (Columns 1–4) and vertical (in Columns 5–8)
strategies for FDI using the 5% benchmark for V to identify deals that are deemed
vertically related.Recall that the sample contains onlydealswhere a ‘purely’ horizontal
or vertical relationship between acquiring and target firms could be identified. The
results have been calculated with statutory and effective average corporate tax rates.
Furthermore, to account for the role of double taxation, a distinction is made between
corporate taxes measured by the host country rate (as in Table 3) and the international
rate (as in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4).23
Some intuitive differences arise with respect to the impact of the control variables
whenCBAsare drivenbydifferent FDI strategies.24 In particular, as expected,GDPhas
23 The detailed decomposition of the international tax effects on horizontal and vertical acquisitions along
the lines reported in Table 4 is presented in a summary table below.
24 To test whether horizontal and vertical deals give rise to different models, the fact that they are
strictly non-nested needs taking into account. For this scenario, the likelihood ratio statistic LR =
(1/
√
n)
∑n
i=1 ln[l(CBAhori |xi j t , τi j t , βhor, γ hor)/ l(CBAveri |xi j t , τi j t , βver, γ ver)]/ω̂2, where n is the
number of observations and ω̂2 = (1/n) ∑ni=1 ln[l(CBAhori |xi j t , τi j t , βhor, γ hor)/ l(CBAveri |xi j t , τi j t ,
βver, γ ver)]2, converges to a standard normal distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, p. 184). For all pairs
of horizontal and vertical location choice models in Table 5, the value of the corresponding test statistic
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only a significant effect on horizontal CBAs, since they reflect the desire to access,
preferably, large markets. Trade freedom has a negative effect on horizontal CBAs
(though this is only significant at the 10% level), which is maybe not surprising since
it is relativelymore attractive to serve amarket via exports, rather than local production,
the lower the trade barriers. Though the host countries encompass developed countries,
a substantial fraction of CBAs in our sample seems to be driven by vertical strategies
(see also Table 2). This is consistent with the findings of Alfaro and Charlton (2009),
who suggested that a class of what they call high-skill intra-industry vertical strategies
arises between countries that are similar in terms of, for example, wage cost. Against
this background, the distinction between horizontal and vertical acquisition strategies
does not give rise to large differences as regards the effect of wage costs.25 Still, labour
market matter for separating the motives for horizontal and vertical acquisitions, but
this effect is captured through labour market flexibility, which has a significant effect
on vertical, but not horizontal CBAs.
With respect to the hypothesis of Mutti and Grubert (2004), for our comprehensive
sample of CBAs, there is some evidence that the effect of corporate taxes is greater
on multinational firms pursuing vertical strategy of multinational integration. The tax
elasticities are in general more negative for vertical FDI. Furthermore, similar to the
result of Table 4, for both horizontal and vertical FDI, corporate taxes matter more
when additional parent country and withholding tax issues are taken into account.
In particular, when measuring taxes with the host country rate (in the odd columns),
the effect is insignificant. Again, there is no evidence that the possibility to defer the
repatriation of profits lowers the impact of the international tax burden for horizontal
or vertical FDI.
With respect to indirect taxes, labour taxes are insignificant for both forms of acqui-
sitions. However, a striking difference that arises in Table 5 is that sales taxes do have
a negative and highly significant impact on horizontal FDI, whilst the correspond-
ing coefficient is lower, and insignificant, for vertical acquisitions. This result, which
has to our knowledge not been observed before, is intuitive since exported goods are
often exempted from local sales taxes and the primary rationale for vertical integra-
tion relates exactly to the production of intermediate inputs to downstream stages
of the supply chain located in other countries. Conversely, with horizontal acquisi-
tions, multinational firms integrate a foreign plant to produce and sell goods locally
such that the sales tax should matter, which is confirmed with the results produced
here.
Footnote 24 continued
is slightly higher than 5, which suggests that the models pertaining to horizontal and vertical deals differ
statistically in a highly significant manner.
25 The outsourcing of labour intensive production stages to low-wage countries arises probably mainly
with emerging markets for which panel data on, e.g. the EATR are not available. However, for the year
2004, some cross-sectional tax data for a larger set of host countries appears in Djankov et al. (2010). Based
on this, we have experimented with a cross section of 43 host countries including large emerging markets
such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa, Thailand, or Turkey. With this, a differential effect does arise in
terms wage costs having a significant impact on vertical, but not on horizontal FDI. Furthermore, similar
to the findings below, sales taxes enter with a negative sign for horizontal, but not for vertical FDI.
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6.4 Robustness checks
The results reported above are robust to a number of changes in variable definitions
and, in the case of distinguishing between horizontal and vertical acquisitions, to
changes in the vertical-relatedness benchmark.
Controlling for the role of institutional quality in FDI is a thorny issue. A broad
range of often highly correlated variables encompassing such things as the protection
of property rights, the pervasiveness of corruption, regulatory efficiency, or the open-
ness of a country to foreign business have been found to affect FDI (see, for example,
Daude and Stein 2007). To comprehensively account for the plethora of institutional
quality variables, we have also recalculated the results with a composite index of eco-
nomic freedom, which summarises variables pertaining to the rule of law, government
efficiency, regulatory efficiency, and open markets. However, this did not change the
essence of our tax results.
Note from the discussion of Sect. 5 that all our results have been calculated with
fixed effects αi t that absorb any variable that does not differ across host countries.26
Amongmany other things, this accounts for trade freedom in the source country, which
could inhibit vertical acquisitions involving exports from the host country back to the
source country. Aside of producing a connection with the location choice model, the
specification of the fixed effect with αi t has also the advantage of eliminating the issue
as towhether the explanatory variables need transforming into logarithmic differences.
For taxes, both the levels (Buettner and Ruf 2007) and differences (Huizinga and
Voget 2009) have been used. However, since the fixed effect αi t absorbs all source and
year-specific heterogeneity, the same coefficient estimates arise when the tax burden
is expresses in (log) levels of a host country or the corresponding (log) difference
between source and host country.
Our data also cover some of the years, during which the global economy witnessed
the extraordinary events of the global financial crisis. Though it is still too early to
assess whether this has lead to structural shifts in the international market for corporate
control, we have calculated our results for the period 1999 to 2007 only. Again, this
did not affect the main conclusions above.
A key feature in terms of highlighting the differences across alternative forms
of CBAs is the characterisation of horizontal and vertical acquisitions. In the results
reported in Table 5, the 5% value was used for V to define vertical relatedness. Chang-
ing the vertical relatedness benchmark reallocates the proportion of CBAs between
the horizontal and vertical strategies (see Sect. 3). The results with the alternative
values for V are reported in Tables 7a, b (see Electronic supplementary material).
Table 7a (see Electronic supplementary material) relates to an increase of V to 10%.
This makes the definition of vertical acquisitions more stringent to pass and increases
the number of CBA deals that are classified as horizontal. In terms of the underlying
determinants, market size continues to be a determinant of horizontal, but not ver-
tical acquisitions. The tax elasticities (relating to the international tax measure) are
significant for both forms of acquisitions but are now approximately equal. However,
26 The dummy variables δ j further account for any specific variable shifting the intercept of the host
country.
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Table 6 Overview of tax elasticities
All CBAs Horizontal CBAs Vertical CBAs
Corporate tax measured by statutory rate
International tax −0.40 −0.23 −0.45
Host country tax −0.21 to −0.27 −0.01 −0.20
Source country tax −0.09
Withholding tax −0.15
Corporate tax measured by EATR
International tax −0.41 −0.27 −0.38
Host country tax −0.17 to -0.28 −0.01 −0.09
Source country tax −0.06
Withholding tax −0.17
Sales tax
Sales tax −0.15 to −0.27 −0.61 to −0.64 −0.12 to −0.16
This table provides an overview of the measured tax elasticities according to (12) across the results reported
in Tables 3, 4 and 5. For all contingencies, the maximum and minimum value is reported. Insignificant
coefficients are marked by italic letters
of particular note is that the sales tax still acts as a negative deterrent of horizontal
acquisitions but has a weaker effect on vertical acquisitions, the negative effect being
statistically significant at the 10% level only. The results with the 1% value for V are
reported in Table 7b (see Electronic supplementary material). With this benchmark,
deals that are deemed to be vertical dominate and the delineation between the alter-
native forms becomes less clear. In terms of the corporate tax elasticities, they are
higher with vertical acquisitions compared with the horizontal sample. The difference
in sales taxes still appears but is now only significant at the 10% level for the horizontal
acquisitions, but remains insignificant for vertical acquisitions. Finally, the difference
between horizontal and vertical FDI pertains perhaps more to the manufacturing sec-
tor, where production processes can be replicated locally or our-sourced, rather than
services. However, recalculating Table 5 for the manufacturing sector only did not
change the essence of the results.
6.5 Summary of tax elasticities
Distinguishing between the different taxmeasures and FDI strategies, Table 6 provides
an overview of the elasticities pertaining to the impact of corporate income and sales
taxes. In the cases where several estimates appear across the different specifications
of Tables 3, 4 and 5, the range with the highest and lowest values of the results is
reported. A relatively consistent picture arises where the corporate tax elasticity on
FDI is around −2/5 when profits are repatriated. This effect can be disentangled into
a host country tax effect with an elasticity of around −1/4 as well as the effect of
additional taxes to be paid in the source (or parent) country as well as withholding
taxes which impact upon CBAs with an elasticity of less than −1/10 and around −1/6,
respectively. Across FDI strategies, the effect of corporate taxes is higher for vertical
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CBAs. Finally, the sales tax elasticity is around −1/5 with substantially higher effects
of up to −2/3 for FDI driven by a horizontal strategy, whilst the effect is insignificant
and close to zero for vertical FDI.
Though our results coincide with the broadly shared view that taxes reduce the
incentive of multinational firms to undertake foreign direct investment (FDI), there is
substantial variation in the estimates of the corresponding tax elasticities. For example,
for taxes levied directly on corporate profits, elasticities between 0 to −5 have been
found (see DeMooij and Ederveen 2003, 2008 for an overview). But, as we show here,
the impact of taxes depends on the characteristics of international taxation and it also
varies across different forms of FDI. In addition, sales taxes impact on horizontal but
not vertical FDI. Overall, the implications of the above range of tax elasticities is that
changing direct and indirect taxes or amending details associated with international
taxation will not only affect the overall level of FDI but impact on the composition
between horizontal and vertical FDI.
7 Summary
Attracting FDI can be a goal for policy-makers and taxes provide an instrument to
achieve this. Previous research has emphasised the role of modest direct corporate
taxes to increase a country’s appeal as host for FDI. For a large sample with more than
80,000 cross-border acquisitions (CBAs), between 30 major countries during 1999 to
2010 period, which reflects—to the best of our knowledge—the most comprehensive
study on the effect of taxes upon host country choices encapsulated in CBA deals, the
key insights that arise from this paper can be summarised as follows:
i. The effect of various forms of taxes upon the desire of multinational enterprises
to acquire a target firm in a given host country is broadly negative.
ii. For corporate taxes, the elasticity lies broadly between −1/20 and −9/20 and for
sales taxes around −1/4.
iii. The effect of corporate taxes depends on the exact measure of taxation, whether
the role of the international tax burden is taken into account, as well as the FDI
strategy pursued by the multinational enterprise. In particular, double taxation—
which arises when the same profit is also taxed in the parent country and when
withholding taxes have to be paid in the host country when repatriating profits—
increases the detrimental effect of corporate taxes on FDI.
iv. For the case of sales taxes, the effect arises primarily with FDI that are driven by
a horizontal strategy, implying that an affiliate is integrated into the multinational
enterprise to sell to the local market. No significant effect on the sales tax could
be found with vertical FDI, which involve subsidiaries producing export goods,
on which the sales tax can normally be reimbursed at the border.
There are two broad policy conclusions that could be derived from our results. First,
whilst confirming that taxes have a negative impact on FDI, the results suggest a more
nuanced interpretation as the effects of taxes will depend not only on the details of
the international tax system, but also on the nature of the FDI strategies which, in
turn, depends on the factors that drive these decisions. Rather than asking about the
effect of corporate taxes on multinational firms, it seems important to recognise that
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the reactions, for example within the international market for corporate control, can be
rather versatile. Second, insofar as the issue of fiscal devaluation gathers pace involving
greater use of value-added taxes, this may impact on FDI but will be contingent on
the motivations for FDI.
The role of taxation within a globalised economy that is largely organised around
multinational enterprises (MNEs) remains high on the policy agenda. Several on-going
debates focus on a number of issues such as tax base erosion, international tax com-
petition, how to deal with double taxation, transfer pricing, or headquarter inversion
to reduce the corporate tax burden. Within the tax and public finance literature, there
is indeed a broad consensus that taxes affect the decision of MNEs to invest in a given
country. Though this study confirms this finding for a large number of cross border
acquisitions, one of the key findings is that tax effects are cumbersome since firms
pursue different strategies and various taxes arise. Further differences that have not
been considered here are those between industries and firms that might give rise to
even more heterogeneity. These, and many other issues, seem to leave ample scope for
additional theoretical and empirical research on the interconnections between taxes
and CBAs.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Country coverage and summary statistics
Country coverage
The common sample covers the following countries.Wage data ofUBS (various years)
refer to the cities in parentheses:
As source: Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Belgium (Brussels), Brazil (Sao
Paulo), Canada (Toronto), China (Shanghai), Czech Republic (Prague), Denmark
(Copenhagen), Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris), Germany (Frankfurt), Greece
(Athens),Hongkong (Hong- kong),Hungary (Budapest), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland
(Dublin), Italy (Milan), Japan (Tokyo), Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands (Amster-
dam), Norway (Oslo), Poland (Warsaw), Portugal (Lisbon), Russia (Moscow), Singa-
pore (Singapore), Slovakia (Bratislava), SouthAfrica (Johannesburg), Spain (Madrid),
Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich), UK (London), USA (Washington).
The common sample covers the following host countries. Wage data of UBS (var-
ious years) refer to the cities in parentheses:
As host: Argentina (Buenos Aires), Australia (Sydney), Austria (Vienna), Belgium
(Brussels), Brazil (Sao Paulo), Canada (Toronto), Chile (Santiago de Chile), Den-
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mark (Copenhagen), Finland (Helsinki), France (Paris), Germany (Frankfurt), Greece
(Athens), India (Mumbai), Indonesia (Djakarta), Ireland (Dublin), Israel (Tel Aviv),
Italy (Milan), Japan (Tokyo), Korea (Seoul), Mexico (Mexico City), Netherlands
(Amsterdam), New Zealand (Auckland), Norway (Oslo), Portugal (Lisbon), South
Africa (Johannesburg), Spain (Madrid), Sweden (Stockholm), Switzerland (Zurich),
Turkey (Istanbul), UK (London), USA (Washington).
Summary statistics of the raw data
CBA GDP Net
wage
Distance Border Invest.
freed.
Trade
freed.
Labour
freed.
Shareholder
righ.
EU*EU
Mean 7.10 9.8e+11 2.16 6.81 0.05 67.90 78.45 65.76 3.03 0.23
Std 25.77 2.0e+12 3.88 5.09 0.23 14.64 8.26 16.44 1.38 0.42
Min 0 5.0e+10 0.01 0.06 0 30 24 37 0 0
Max 513 1.2e+13 84.74 19.84 1 95 90 100 5 1
(1-EU)
*EU
EURO*
EURO
(1-EURO)
*EURO
Exchange
rate
Corporate tax Sales
tax
Labour
tax
Statutory EATR EMTR
Mean 0.23 0.11 0.24 1.05 30.90 27.50 18.39 16.49 24.63
Std 0.42 0.32 0.43 0.55 6.72 5.68 5.42 5.48 8.062
Min 0 0 0 0.16 10 8.63 4.78 5 8
Max 1 1 1 4.70 51.56 43.77 32.44 25 46
Appendix 2: Data description and additional results
Variable Description Source
Dependent variable:
ni j t Number of cross-border acquisition deals between the
source country i and host country j during year t
Compiled
Tax variables
Corporate tax
(statutory)
Statutory tax rate on corporate income in country j KPMG, Corporate and
Indirect Tax Survey
Corporate tax
(EATR)
Effective average tax rate (EATR) on corporate income
in country j
CBT Tax Database (2012)
Corporate tax
(EMTR)
Effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) on corporate
income in country j . This is calculated by the
difference between the pre-tax and post-tax required
rates of return
CBT Tax Database (2012)
Sales tax Value-added tax (VAT) rate and other sales taxes IMF, Tax Policy Division
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Variable Description Source
Labour tax Compulsory social security and income tax
contributions in per cent of gross salaries as published
in the Prices and Earnings survey of UBS. For the first
part of our sample, the Prices and Earnings survey is
only published triennially. Values of the missing years
have been filled with the closest observation available.
In particular, the values of the years 1999 and 2001
employ the 2000 data, the values for the years 2002
and 2004 employ the 2003 data, and the values for the
years 2005 and 2007 employ the 2006 data. Since
2008 yearly updates of the Prices and Earnings survey
are available
UBS, Prices and Earnings.
See also Braconier et al.
(2005)
Withholding tax Withholding tax between countries assuming that profits
are repatriated in form of dividends
KPMG, Corporate and
Indirect Tax Survey.
Deloitte International
Tax Source.
Control variables:
Border Common border between source and host country Compiled
Distance Great circular between the capital city of the source and
host country
Compiled
EUit ∗ EU jt Variable indicating the EU membership of the source
and host country
Compiled
(1 − EUit ) ∗
EU jt
Variable indicating the EU membership of the host (but
not the source) country
Compiled
EU ROit ∗
EU RO jt
Variable indicating that the source and host country
share the Euro as common currency
Compiled
(1−EU ROit )∗
EU RO jt
Variable indicating the EURO membership of the host
(but not the source) country
Compiled
Exchange rate Real (bilateral) exchange rate with US$ World Development
Indicators
GDP Real gross domestic product in US$ with base year
2000 of the host country j
World Development
Indicators
Investment
freedom
Index of freedom of investment referring to whether
there is a foreign investment code that defines the
country’s investment laws and procedures; whether
the government encourages foreign investment
through fair and equitable treatment of investors;
whether there are restrictions on access to foreign
exchange; whether foreign firms are treated the same
as domestic firms under the law whether the
government imposes restrictions on payments,
transfers, and capital transactions; and whether
specific industries are closed to foreign investment
Heritage Foundation
Labour freedom Index of labour market freedom on a scale from 10 to 90
measuring dimension such as minimum wages,
regulation against layoffs, regulatory burden on
hirings etc.
Heritage Foundation
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Variable Description Source
Net wage Wage in the host country net of compulsory social
security contributions as published in the Prices and
Earnings survey of UBS. Wages are measured by an
index referring to the hourly income of 13 comparable
professions as paid in the capital city or the financial
centre of a country. For the first part of our sample, the
Prices and Earnings survey is only published
triennially. Values of the missing years have been
filled with the closest observation available. In
particular, the values of the years 1999 and 2001
employ the 2000 data, the values for the years 2002
and 2004 employ the 2003 data, and the values for the
years 2005 and 2007 employ the 2006 data. Since
2008 yearly updates of the Prices and Earnings survey
are available
UBS, Prices and Earnings.
See also Braconier et al.
(2005)
Shareholder
rights
Shareholder rights are measured by an anti-directors
rights index reflecting (i) the possibility of
shareholders to mail their proxy vote, (ii) whether
shareholders are required to deposit their shares prior
to the General Shareholders Meeting (iii) whether
cumulative voting is allowed (iv) an oppressed
minorities mechanism exists (5) whether the
minimum stake allowing shareholders to call for an
extraordinary shareholders meeting is more or less
than 10%. Higher values mean more power for
shareholders
La Porta et al. (1998)
Trade freedom Index of freedom of international trade (tariff and
non-tariff barriers) on a scale from 10 to 90
Heritage Foundation
Appendix 3: On the choice of the Poisson regression
Econometric models that are capable to handle location choices include the con-
ditional logit model, where hdi j t is the dependent variable. The conditional logit
models takes the joint distribution over all deals d, source countries i , host coun-
tries j , and the 11 years t under consideration enter the log-likelihood function
ln Lcl = ∑Dd=1 ∑Ni=1 ∑Jj=1 ∑Tt=1 ln(Pdi j t )with Pdi j t defined by (9). Since Pdi j t = Pi jt ,
the number ni j t of CBAs can be factored out, that is Lcl = ∑Ii=1 ∑Jj=1 ∑Tt=1 ni j t Pi j t .
Inserting (9) yields
ln Lcl =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ni j t (̃xi j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δ j )
−
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
[
ni j t ln
( I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
exp(̃xi j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δ j )
)]
, (10)
from which the coefficients β and γ can be estimated.
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In practice, a caveat against the conditional logit model is that it can require
massive amounts of data for estimation. To avoid this caveat, Guimarães et al.
(2003) have proposed to turn to the Poisson regression for the coefficient estima-
tion in location choice models. This assumes that ni j t is Poisson distributed, that is
Prob[n = ni j t ] = [exp(−λi j t )λni j tj t ]/ni j t ! whilst an exponential mean transforma-
tion connects the Poisson parameter λi j t with the explanatory variables of (8), that is
E[ni j t ] = λi j t = exp(̃xi j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δi + δ j + δt ) = αi t exp(̃x jtβ + τ̃i j tγ + δ j ). For
our case with panel data, αi t = exp(δi + δt ) absorbs the heterogeneity from different
source countries and years and is here treated as fixed effect. Guimarães et al. (2003)
have shown that the concentrated log-likelihood function, which no longer depends
on αi t , equals
ln L pc =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
ni j t (̃xi j tβ + τ̃i j tγ + δ j )
−
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
[
ni j t ln
( I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
exp(̃xi j tβ+τ̃i j tγ +δ j )
)]
+C. (11)
Since (11) differs from (10) only as regards the constant C , the estimates of β and
γ of a Poisson regression and a conditional logit model are identical!
Owing to different asymptotic assumptions, in small samples, the standard devia-
tions can differ between the logit model and the Poisson regression. However, Schmid-
heiny and Brülhart (2011, p. 219) show that clustering at the group level αi t yields
asymptotically identical SE. For our case with thousands of count variables that reflect
many more location choices embodied in CBA deals, these asymptotic properties are
likely to hold as long as the SE are appropriately clustered.
As long as the variables are transformed into logarithms, the coefficients (β and
γ ) of the Poisson regression have the interpretation of an elasticity with respect to the
expected number of acquisitions E[ni j t ]. Hence, the (direct) tax elasticity η, given by
η = ∂E[ni j t ]
∂τi j t
τi j t
E[ni j t ] = γ, (12)
is constant.27
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